Corporate and Private Warriors and This American Life

Since I spaced on posting last week, I'm incorporating Singer's piece with the Frontline video and the radio program into one long post. It works well, though, because there are so many interconnections and similarities that become more obvious by looking at them together.

In all three I was struck by a five key points:
1) The sheer number of private contractors
Singer writes about the vastness of these forces around the world, while Frontline points to the 50,000 military contrators, 20,000 security guards, and 40,000 reconstruction workers. In both instances I was shocked by the figures and the extent of the forces. I don't really know what else to say. It's almost too much to take in, those numbers are just unbelievable, but I suppose it is necessary when recruitment is down in the military. In other cases, skilled retired military officials choose PMF work because it is so much more lucrative. Either way, the growing number of PMF forces does pose a sort of threat to the role of the US military, as is clear in the second point I noticed:
2)Tensions with US military forces
Notably this was explored in the argument betweent the contractors and the soldier when Nancy (NPR) was in Baghdad, but it was also apparent in the Frontline video. In the case of the contractor's deaths in Fallujah, one Marine officer accounted for the escalation of conflict that followed in part because the Marines had to change their tactics in the city. Since the PMF wasn't accountable for the deaths, the accountability was defaulted to the other American forces there: the military. To a large extent, the tension exists because civilians see all the occupation forces as part of the same US operation, but within the ranks, the difference in accountability - to the US people, to Iraqi citizens, and to the government - is apparent. I was especially interested in the two "Mayors" in Camp Anaconda. While the private Mayor evaded and excused away the question of breaking down the budget, the US military Mayor openly stated the price breakdown for meals per plate. That leads into number 3:
3) The lack of transparency and accountability, including the lack of reporting of casualties
In addition to the question of transparency made clear by the Mayors at Anaconda, the problem of accountability is serious. One quote within the Singer article points to the importance of traditional ideas of military accountability:

As professionals, military officers are bound by a code of ethics, serve a
higher purpose, and fulfuill a societal need. Their craft sets them apart from
other professionals in that the application of military power is not comparable
to a commercial service. Military professionals deal in life and death matters,
and the application of their craft has potential implications for the rise and
fall of governments.(Singer 8)

This makes sense to me. What does not make sense is that the switch to PMFs has happened with little fanfare or questioning, yet these companies cannot guarantee, nor do they attempt to (if we believe Singer, Frontline, and NPR), the same kind of accountability or code of ethics. Ethically, it seems outrageous that PMFs don't disclose casualties, but the March 31, 2004 Fallujah deaths of 4 contractors is one example of this. Frontline's mention of lawsuits by families of contractors who died demonstrates that the problem of accountability and transparency is directly related to the well-being and security of the private forces. This lack of transparency in terms of disclosing everything from finances to casualties is alarming. Even if every other aspect of hiring PMFs appeared logical, this question of accountability screams "illegitimate" and I can't believe that these countries are getting away with this all over the world. If a cost-benefit analysis were conducted, the high catering bill would be the least of their problems. I was amazed when Frontline spoke of the siphoning of money away from the reconstruction funding to logisitics. How are these PMFs getting away with funding three $20 meals a day per soldier, when reconstruction projects (also conducted by PMFS, but not in the Green Zone) are losing funding meant for infrastructure building and the kind of reconstruction that might make it possible for the military to get out of Iraq more quickly. To me, this is a clear example of the problem with having "for-profit armies" (NPR), because there is no point when war becomes un-profitable for companies who's entire business is war. Which leads me to the entire question of monetary benfits of PFMs:
4) The huge paycheck associated with private contractors AKA what motivates them to come
As Ira Glass said: "Should we just see them as mercenaries? Are they motivated by feelings that are more idealistic than that?" Security guys make upwards of $100,000 a year, and the 1st $80,000 isn't taxed if not in the US for 330 days. Contractors make $80,000 on average. Many told Nancy that it was not just about the money, and claimed they were also there to help, with some admitting they came for adventure. But I have a hard time believing that the money isn't the biggest contributing factor. Consider the figures given by one officer: $1,500/month in military - same guy for KBR makes $10,000/month ($400-$1000 per day, according to Frontline). I was left with the same question Nancy asked: how do we save money using private contractors? We don't, according to the military official.

So I am left wondering about an issue Singer brings up on pages 18 and 19: while in the past, "the private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international relations," today the way that PMFs have manifested has "deprivileged" the state's role in security issues. In light of this transfer of duty and commodification of violence, how can we possibly end the military occupation in Iraq, when it is inextricably tied to one of the most lucrative industries in the US?